Argentina’s inflation is now approaching the 20% range, as it has
recently accelerated from the mid-teens levels. There is now a heated debated
about its causes, the possible paths that inflation can take in the future and
the key variables that one needs to monitor in order to try to predict where it
can go.
In contrast to previous episodes, this inflation process, which started
towards the middle of the decade, was not driven by the needs to print money to
finance the fiscal deficit. Instead it was a result of a combination of
factors. On one side, the economy
started to reach full capacity in many sectors and there was starting to appear
a large number of bottlenecks.
Despite the need to slowdown the growth in aggregate demand,
macroeconomic policies continued to have an expansionary bias. On the fiscal
side, nominal expenditures where growing at annual rates above 20%, which meant
that there was a clear fiscal impulse despite the fiscal surpluses that the
Government maintained during those years.
The Central Bank did not take upon itself the task of fighting
inflation, as monetary growth accompanied the evolution of nominal GDP and in
this sense it followed an accommodating monetary policy while providing an
expansionary bias by keeping nominal interest rates well below inflation.
As a result macroeconomic policies were aiming at lower rates of
inflation, but instead they maintained sustained growth in nominal aggregate
demand. While there was ample excess capacity (as in the 2002 to 2004 or 2005),
this increase in demand was satisfied through a rise in aggregate supply, but
once this excess capacity started to disappear most of the pressures fell on
inflation.
To make matters worse the Government granted large wage increases (of
around 20% per annum), as the unions became stronger once the rate of
unemployment fell to one digit. Besides,
it was a way to show gratitude to the union leaders that were key supporters of
the Government.
Inflation receded in the second half of 2008, after reaching 25%, thanks
to the international financial crisis that affected aggregate demand and caused
the first recession in the Kirchner era and the fall in commodity prices that
removed some of the pressure on food prices.
However, this was a short pause, as inflation started to accelerate
again since the last quarter of last year and is now becoming a monster that is
difficult to tame.
In summary, during these years there has not been an anti-inflation
policy. Perhaps the only exception has been Secretary Moreno, who single handed tried through the
use of price controls and guidelines to keep a lid on price increases.
But the policy inconsistency of the past implied that these attempts to
rely on controls and intimidation were short lived and inflation is again on
the rise, and this time the risks are higher.
The main problems are now the Government needs to resort to the Central
Bank to meet the financial requirements and the fiscal deficit as it has no
access to the markets, unions remain strong and monetary policy still has a
clear expansionary bias.
These expansionary policies are in place after four years of double
digit rates of inflation and when workers and firms have already incorporated
expectations that in the best case scenario inflation will remain at 20%. Inflation inertia is dominating the process,
and experience shows that once this type of process starts it is difficult to
reverse it.
In the meantime the Government is making two big mistakes in its
analysis of the causes of the inflation process. First, it argues that this is
a realignment of relative prices (namely meat and wheat) instead of realizing
that this is a generalized and persistent increase in the price level. What they don’t see (or don’t want to admit)
is that most wage and price adjustments are staggered over time and hence there
is always one price that explains inflation in a given month. The fact is that
all prices and wages are moving upwards, though not all simultaneously.
The second and certainly more risky mistake is that the Government has
been arguing that “supply constraints” are the main reason for the recent
acceleration of inflation, so-called as “relative price adjustments” by the
Government. Indeed, there are some “supply constraints” in some durable and
non-durable final consumption products, as some food products. Specifically,
the indexes of capacity utilization in the durable and non-durable final
consumption products have remained in the last two months in the maximum levels
of at least the last ten years, suggesting that there is excess demand in those
sectors, despite the 2009 recession, in part as a result of a relatively lower investment.
This result may not be a surprise, since several of those sectors in last years
have been under Government intervention and regulation, such as several food
sectors (meat, milk, wheat, etc.) or public utilities (electricity, natural
gas, etc.), with regulated prices and exports quotas. Due to the lack of
investment incentives, output and installed capacity in those sectors remained
relatively stagnant in past years, and even decreased in several cases.
While the supply constraints have been a factor affecting inflation,
though it is wrong to conclude from this evidence that the Government will be
able to deal with this issue through increases in supply. Here, there and
everywhere when there are generalized pressures by aggregate demand excesses in
the short run the only solution is to restrain demand or to increase
imports. Argentina is not likely to follow
neither recipe so the effects should be very clear.
Aggregate demand is now growing at around 20/25% per year in nominal
terms. The Government believes that the answer is to increase supply, and hence
it is meeting with producers to diagnose where the bottlenecks are and to try
to provide credit lines to get them to invest and increase production. The argument does not take into account that investment
takes time to mature and to have effects on production, nor does it calculate
how much investment needs to increase to generate real growth of around 8
percent (certainly much more that the current 22% of GDP).
All the risks appear to be on the upside, as the Central Bank seems
ready and able to maintain large rates of monetary and credit growth and
interest rates that remain negative in real terms, while the Government plans
to keep the current high rates of growth in nominal expenditures and to resort
to the Central Bank to obtain the necessary financing. This is an explosive
mix.
Despite all these concerns there is a caveat. It would be prudent for
our readers to disregard the uneasiness about inflation presented in this
analysis as it was done by a so called neoliberal, orthodox economist, who does
not fully understand the virtues of supply side economics, nor Say’s Law in
reverse (that demand creates its own supply).



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